Believe you might have responded to the thread instead of me (at least the response makes sense).
Gonna provide a bit of a crash course below:
So the fundamentals of asymmetric encryption relies on two sets of keys, the public key that anyone can see and the private key which is (or is assumed to be) a secret to anyone outside of the owner . These keys are linked together via the magic of math. This is generally seen as x509 based certificate keypairs in the wild.
In a basic TLS session (very very broadly), a connection will be formed using the following sequence:
Jill wants to send an encrypted message to Bob.
Jill uses Bob’s public key (from his accessible certificate) to encrypt the message.
Bob receives the encrypted message, and decrypts it with his private key.
This is grossly over simplified, but it explains it in a rough and understandable way. In the wild… You see encrypted sessions set up this way all the time. When you access your GP portal webpage, Google, ect, your workstation is using the offered public key to establish this connection as long as the certificate is from a source your system trusts (the certificates you’ve been exporting and importing into your workstations CA trust folder).
What’s happening on your GP tho (I’m guessing) is that the session is requiring two-way proof of identity from the workstation using the certificate authority that’s been assigned in the GP portal config. By this I mean… The firewall proves it is who it says it is using a certificate key-pair, and then the workstation does the same (with a certificate key-pair that was issued from the expected CA).
Double check your config to see what’s currently set up as the expected CA for the portal, and then double check your workstation (making sure you open up certificate management in a machine context) to make sure there’s a properly configured certificate from that CA installed on it.
There’s a bunch more I didn’t touch on, but this should be at least a starting point for you.